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Over the border and under the radar:
can illegal migrants be active citizens?
Matthew Clarke
Active citizens can become a powerful driver of development by holding to popular account
those who traditionally wield decision-making power at the local and national levels. Active
citizenship draws from a long history of understanding the importance of community partici-
pation and ownership of development interventions. However, in spite of its inherent strengths,
active citizenship may not be a possible (or optimal) outcome in all circumstances. This article
argues for the realistic expectation of active citizenship (and indeed participation) of one
specific sub-population in Thailand, where the overwhelming majority of illegal migrants
(of an estimated total of 800,000–1.5 million) are Burmese. Their precarious existence as
illegal migrants compounds the development needs that confront any poor community. This
in turn hinders their ability to engage actively in the development process. This article
reviews the lessons learned by a Thai-based NGO that has worked with illegal Burmese
migrants for more than 15 years. It discusses the unique strengths and weakness of these
illegal communities, whether or not it is appropriate to seek to engage them as active citizens,
and the implications for NGOs working with such communities. It suggests that the unique role
that NGOs must play, in cases where public participation could endanger the lives of commu-
nity members, is that of advocate-guardians, whereby they assume the role of active citizen on
behalf of the community in question and simultaneously provide development interventions and
advocate on its behalf.
KEY WORDS: Civil Society; Gender and Diversity; East Asia
Introduction
Active citizenship has recently attracted interest because of its ability to make direct links
between micro-level community and macro-level national development processes. Active citi-
zenship has therefore come to inhabit a new ‘meso’ space which bridges the local and the
national. Within this space, active citizens can not only hold decision makers to account more
effectively at the national level, but they can also themselves become legitimate voices within
the decision-making process (Burnell 2007). This maturing of the role of community members
within national-level forums has its antecedents within the longer history of community
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participation in community-development interventions. Active citizenship therefore presupposes
a level of community participation and ownership of development processes and interventions.
Korten (1990) long ago predicted the importance of community participation and ownership
of development interventions in his four NGO typologies. Within Korten’s stylised typologies,
there is a continuum of (Northern) NGO practice, beginning with the provision of relief and
welfare services, progressing to the delivery of community development, moving from there
to sustainable systems of development, and finally finding expression as a people’s movement.
The implicit assumption within this continuum is that community participation increases
throughout the progression, and that this is inherently right and proper. Community partici-
pation within development interventions has now become widely accepted as the minimum
requirement for successful and sustained development outcomes (see Chambers 2005).
Without active community involvement (not passive acceptance) at all stages of community
development, including needs analysis, project identification and design, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation, it is unlikely that any impact of the particular intervention will be
sustained (Uphoff et al. 1998; Dale 2004). Sustaining the impact of a community-development
intervention is therefore more likely to be achieved, experienced indicates, if the beneficiaries –
the local community – and other key stakeholders have actively participated in and ‘own’ the
intervention. There are a number of reasons for this. First, including these directly affected
groups in the planning stages will more likely ensure that the appropriate development needs
and their causes are identified. Second, the planned responses will better take into account
the resources and strengths of the local communities, thus ensuring that there is less reliance
on external inputs. Finally, community participation will also aid the on-going management
of the project, as the decision-making processes will have been developed in the initial
stages to include the relevant local beneficiaries and key stakeholders: an involvement which
will continue after the external funding has ceased.
Such participation becomes self-supporting, and participation begets further participation.
Active citizenship can therefore be understood as the inevitable and logical conclusion of com-
munity participation. Active citizens can become a powerful driver of development by holding
to popular account those who traditionally wield decision-making power at the local and
national levels. As noted, active citizenship draws from a long history of understanding the
importance of community participation and ownership of development interventions.
However, participation has itself become fetishised to some degree, so that its importance is
considered paramount in all development interventions. Active citizenship in turn therefore
is also assumed to be optimal in all circumstances. Yet in spite of its inherent strengths,
active citizenship may not be a possible (or optimal) outcome in all circumstances.
This article argues for the realistic expectation of active citizenship (and indeed participation)
of one specific sub-population within Thailand: illegal Burmese migrants. The article is also
interested in considering the (lack of) potential for active citizenship for communities who
(for a variety of reasons) are unable to initiate the first step of community participation. It dis-
cusses whether active citizenship should always be a goal for community-development prac-
titioners. More specifically, this article considers illegal Burmese migrants living in various
locations throughout Thailand and describes the problems confronting NGOs and other commu-
nity-based organisations (CBOs) in their attempts to achieve even minimal levels of community
participation, let alone functioning levels of active citizenship. A new typology, describing the
unique role that NGOs must play in these circumstances, is introduced: advocate-guardian,
whereby NGOs assume the role of active citizen on behalf of the community in question and
simultaneously provide development interventions and advocate on its behalf. Expecting par-
ticipation from these communities actually endangers the lives of community members and
is therefore an inappropriate expectation or requirement.
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Community participation and active citizenship are driving forces in achieving sustainable
development outcomes at both the local and national levels. This is because a commitment
to sustainability based on open and inclusive participatory processes is more likely to lead to
more positive long-term results and more robust development interventions. Over a period of
time, considerable resources have been expended on developing tools and techniques that facili-
tate participation. A number of common participatory techniques exist, including Rapid Rural
Appraisal (RRA), Participatory Research Action (PRA), and Participatory Learning Action
(PLA). Underpinning these approaches is a basic tenet that the community are experts vis a`
vis their own circumstances, and that they are the holders of the knowledge required to
resolve issues and problems currently being experienced (Dale 2004). While it is accepted
that external funds, technical expertise, and the need to facilitate the sharing of community
knowledge are also required, the paradigm within these techniques calls for communities to
be acknowledged as the primary holders of information and skills (Chambers 2005).
‘Participation’ has therefore become a talisman within development practice. Such is the
extent of the participation fetish that all international financial institutions, multilateral
agencies, national governments, and NGOs have, by and large, incorporated the term ‘partici-
pation’ into their development jargon (see Chambers 1983; Stiglitz 1999; Craig and Porter
1997; Sihlongonyane 2003). If the rhetoric is transformed into practice, this means that commu-
nity members are actively encouraged to identify their own needs, design the response,
implement the project activities, and also monitor and evaluate their progress. The processes
that are used differ between institutional types, as well as between institutions themselves,
but a common approach is the establishment of Project Community Management Committees
(PCMC). Such a committee holds the decision-making power and includes the local benefici-
aries, key stakeholders, and local partners.
Community participation requires participation from all sectors of the community – not
solely from entrenched community leaders or those with interests to protect and enhance. Com-
munity participation requires the voices of women, the young, the old, and landless, disabled,
and other marginalised groups, just as it does the voices of traditional leaders, religious leaders,
and landowners. Such participation necessarily requires the assisting agency to reconsider itself
as a ‘partner’ to these communities. Re-imagining these relationships is not without difficulty.
Participation is difficult
If there have been delays in transforming rhetoric about participation into current practice, it is
largely because achieving full and active participation1 is difficult within most communities.
Ensuring that all key stakeholders are actively engaged is difficult – and made more so by
the factor of poverty.
Achieving active participation requires a conscious effort. Participation is not automatic, nor
can it be assumed without developing relationships over time with key stakeholder groups.
Effective relationships must be built with beneficiaries, other NGOs or community-based
organisations and associations, local religious groups, and (depending on the intervention
itself) local support networks. (For example, it is common in HIV and AIDS prevention and
care interventions to include hairdressers and taxi drivers, because they form natural support
networks for commercial sex workers and their clients (Clarke 2002).)
Active participation requires that all these (often desperate) groups are included at the very
initial stages of the project-planning process, including needs analysis and project identification.
Active engagement with these stakeholders in this phase means that the ‘power’ or initiative is



































clearly given over to the local community. This is a very powerful statement of intent, indicat-
ing to local communities a real recognition of their own expertise and ability to address current
and future problems. By handing over the decision-making power to the local community, their
traditionally passive position can no longer be sustained: they must actively participate, or the
intervention will fail. This responsibility is therefore an impetus for action (Zivets 2003).
It is naı¨ve, however, to think that such participation is easily achieved. It is at the very least an
extremely time-consuming process, which often makes heavy demands on both the NGO and
the local community. Poor communities are similar to communities in any other part of the
world: they are heterogeneous and they consist of sub-groups and individuals who seek to
pursue their own interests at the expense of others. It is therefore necessary for NGOs to nego-
tiate the partnerships between the various (sometimes competing) interests and act as brokers
when allowing the community to take the initiative in the decision-making process (Gosling
and Edwards 1995). The role of NGOs therefore does not simply expire once they hand over
power to the community. In reality, their role becomes increasingly important in assisting
the community to work cohesively in designing, implementing, managing, and monitoring
the intervention. Such skills are largely gained through experience over time, and therefore
the selection of staff becomes a paramount factor in facilitating community participation.
Participation of the poor
The preceding discussion mentioned the various groups that must actively participate in any
development intervention if it is to be sustained over the long term. Yet the groups that are
the major beneficiary of development interventions are precisely those least likely to participate
actively – that is, the very poor. (Most communities will have various levels of poverty, even if
they all look relatively poor to the uninitiated outsider.) Poverty – especially extreme poverty –
directly affects people’s ability to participate and contribute to local community-development
interventions. As will be discussed below, these constraints are magnified when seeking to
encourage poor communities to move from being participants at the micro level to active citi-
zens at the meso and macro levels.
The reasons for this constraint on community participation are directly linked to poverty.
Day-to-day survival for those who are extremely poor requires enormously hard work (see
Easterly 2002 and Yunnis 2003 for numerous vignettes describing the long days and hard
work undertaken by poor women and men to earn sufficient income to barely feed, clothe,
and provide shelter for their families). Participation (and ownership) requires a commitment
of time and effort that the extremely poor are unlikely to be able to give. Participation often
requires long discussions, travel to and from meetings, and assisting with designing or deliver-
ing interventions during the implementation phase. If the poor are working long hours, they will
be unable to contribute greatly to such interventions, and therefore their participation may be
somewhat marginal. Certainly, their desire to participate may be relatively low if their immedi-
ate goal is simply survival.
The goal of having the poor participate in community-development interventions therefore
requires NGO staff to seek them out purposely and find ways to accommodate their particular
circumstances. Such accommodation need not be complicated, but may in fact be predicated on
a simple acknowledgement of their poverty of time as well as their economic poverty. Therefore
it may be necessary for meetings of stakeholders to be held where the poor naturally congregate –
either at their own homes or at local community venues – so that the distance that the poor
need to travel is reduced. PCMC meetings may have to be timed to take account of the commit-
ments of the poorer members of the community. If there are peak periods of work (such as
harvest time), it may be better to postpone PCMC meetings, or plan them for more
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convenient times. Finally, it may also be necessary to compensate poor community members for
their time spent in participating. This is contentious, but the provision of food and a small
per diem allowance to pay for transport costs or lost earnings may be necessary to ensure
participation of all representatives of the community.
The difficulties discussed above are multiplied when the overriding characteristic of the poor
in question is their illegal migrant status. Effective participation depends on the availability of
some free time, personal freedom of movement, and the ability to work co-operatively – but
illegal migrants must remain invisible to authorities, to ensure their personal safety and to
avoid harassment and deportation. As such, participation is a risky behaviour for those
without legal status.
Overview of illegal migrants in Thailand
Estimates of the number of migrants within Thailand vary between 800,000 and 1.5 million
(AMC 2002), but it is commonly thought that there are at least 1 million, compared with
Thailand’s population of approximately 65 million.2 Accurate estimates are difficult to
make, because different authorities use different data. For example, estimates of migrants
can differ by a factor of four between the Labour Ministry (drawing on the evidence of regis-
trations and employer surveys) and the Health Ministry (drawing on records of hospital treat-
ments) (Urbano 2006). Moreover, the status of Burmese workers in Thailand is fluid, which
further complicates estimates of their number. Policies towards migrants have changed over
time, and enforcement of the law depends largely on local authorities. The Thai government’s
treatment of migrant workers, particularly Burmese, has fluctuated with economic and political
agendas. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the government cracked down on illegal
migrants and expelled thousands of unregistered workers (Urbano 2006: 29). More recently,
the Thai government reviewed the status of migrant workers with a 2003 Memorandum of
Understanding with the Burmese government, in which migrant workers were to be protected
by certain conditions, including minimum wages, eight-hour working shifts, and the right to
paid time off for national holidays (Belton 2005). This is reviewed annually through
Cabinet Resolutions. While still considered ‘illegal’, registered workers are permitted to
work. Registration itself is not without costs, and the employers must themselves sponsor
the migrants. In addition to paying permit fees (around 2000 THB, or E44), migrants must
purchase a photo card and health insurance, and undergo a medical examination (at a total
cost of almost 3000 THB).
Migration into Thailand from neighbouring countries is not new. Having become affluent
relatively recently, Thailand is attractive to migrant workers within the region who are
seeking to improve their economic circumstances3 (see Table 1), with the vast majority of
migrants being Burmese. However, it is rare for Burmese migrants to move beyond Thailand
or the Mekong region (ILO 2001; ARCM 2004).
It is not difficult to migrate to Thailand from Burma. (The country is also known as Myanmar,
but its more familiar name is used in this article.) The shared border, more than 2400 km long,
runs through ten Thai provinces, and it is not commonly patrolled or policed in any effective
manner. According to Urbano (2006: 16),
[t]he border between Burma and Thailand cuts through jungle, the navigable river courses
of the Salween and Thaungyin, and the Dalween ranges. The Asian Highway, funded by
the UN and the Asia Development Bank, carves a swathe through Northern Thailand,
Burma and onto India, expanding the travel and trading routes. Many of the Borders
are unmarked and unpatrolled.



































There are four permanent crossing points connecting Burmese and Thai towns respect-
ively: Tachelik and Mae Sai, Myawaddy and Mae Sot, Kawthaung and Ranong; and the
Three Pagodas Pass between Ye and Kanchanaburi. These are the most important
towns for cross border trade (Human Rights Watch 1993). There are an estimated 320
unofficial land and see crossing points too (AMC 2002). As a gauge of the ease of
passage and of the potential number of Burmese in Thailand, locals estimate that
around 500 Burmese cross the Thai–Burma Friendship Bridge between Myawaddy and
Mae Sot every day. (Panam et al. 2004)
Crossing the border is more like moving from one town into another, rather than crossing an
international frontier. It is common for Burmese to cross into Thailand on a daily basis (with
or without a day pass) for employment, shopping, or health care.4 The Thai currency is
commonly used in the Burmese border townships.
Over a period of 40 years in which political, social, and economic conditions have worsened
in Burma, there has been a corresponding improvement in all facets of life within Thailand, as a
result of the extraordinary levels of economic growth (notwithstanding the 1997 financial crisis)
during the past few decades (Clarke and Islam 2004). This economic growth has occurred in all
sectors and created a greater demand for both skilled and unskilled labour. As the Thai economy
has developed, there has been an observed aversion to some jobs (coined the Three ‘Ds’ –
dangerous, dirty, and disdained) (Physicians for Human Rights 2004). ‘Conveniently, Burma
is a plentiful source of cheap, pliant labour for Thai industry’ (Urbano 2006: 22). Although
migration is both risky and illegal, many Burmese have sought to relocate to Thailand
(either temporarily or permanently) in order to escape the turmoil in their own country and
to take advantage of Thailand’s relative prosperity. Certainly economic reasons underpinned
migrants’ decisions to travel to Thailand, with migrants most commonly citing the poor
employment opportunities and poverty in Burma, compared with Thailand.
It is important to note, however, that migrant populations are not homogeneous throughout
Thailand (ARCM 2004). Different localities have their own characteristics, and these must
be considered when planning and implementing development interventions. Most important
Table 1. Comparison of key indices between Burma and Thailand
Burma Thailand
Population (million) 50 65
GDP (PPP$) 258 2440
GDP composition by sector (%) Agriculture 42 Agriculture 11
Manufacturing 17 Manufacturing 40
Services 41 Services 49
Life expectancy at birth (years) 56.2 (male) 66.0 (male)
61.8 (female) 72.7 (female)
Under-5 child mortality (per 1000 live births) 109 28
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 77 24
Total per capita expenditure on health (PPP$) 26 254
Adult literacy (%) 85 96
Girls in primary school (%) 49 97
Source: World Bank (2008)
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is the difference in the ratio between Burmese migrants and the local population. For example,
in Mae Sot, illegal Burmese migrants outnumber Thais by a ratio of 3:1, whereas in Phuket
Thais outnumber Burmese 4:1. The populations are relatively equal in Ranong. In Mae Sot
most migrants are ethnic Burmese, while the majority in Ranong are Dawei peoples. Ranong
has the largest number of unregistered migrants, whereas Mae Sot has the largest number of
migrants who are registered. Interestingly, there are also differences in the support groups in
the different sites. For example, Mae Sot has the largest number of migrants who arrived
without any support networks, and Ranong has the largest number of migrants who travelled
with family members. The majority of migrants working in Ranong have worked in other
areas previously, compared with the situation in Mae Sot, which is the first destination
reached by these migrant workers. Most migrant workers in Ranong are employed in the
fishing industry, while the most common occupation in Mae Sot is factory work. Over and
above these differences, it is important to note that the age profile of migrants is similar
across each site, with the majority aged between 19 and 25 years (ARCM 2004).
While the employment conditions for migrant workers (whether they be fishermen, construc-
tion workers, factory workers, or day labourers) are difficult, close to 90 per cent report that they
are not exploited in Thailand (ARCM 2004). Indeed, their migration was normally organised by
friends, family, or the migrant themselves and did not involve a third party or ‘trafficking’
syndicate (ILO–IPEC 2001; Urbano 2006). So although the migrants have actively sought to
relocate to Thailand, this ability to be active is not to their advantage in the circumstances of
being an illegal migrant – whereby ‘invisibility’ becomes critical for survival.
Difficulties of working with Burmese migrants
Working with illegal Burmese migrants is complicated. However, the needs of these commu-
nities demand that they be given prominence when NGOs are facilitating community-
development activities in these border towns. One such NGO5 has been working within these
communities for 15 years in four major locations: Mae Sot, Mae Sai, Ranong, and the
fishing-port town of Phuket. During this time, this NGO has undertaken a range of commu-
nity-development interventions, but with a primary focus on health care and prevention. The
following discussion is based on the author’s meta-evaluation of its work.
The difficulties of working with illegal Burmese migrants are different in several respects
from the problems of working with poor Thai communities. First, all Burmese migrants are
illegal, whether they are registered to work or not. Those unregistered to work have no
formal legal protection; they lack access to education and health services, and are frequently
exploited by employers and landlords. They can also be arrested and deported at any time
without recourse (see Table 2 for types of abuse experienced, for example, in Mae Sot).
Second, given this precarious existence, these communities are extremely mobile. It is
estimated that 50 per cent of migrants in Mae Sot move each year to avoid debt and/or
police harassment, or to seek better employment opportunities.6
Working with such mobile communities is difficult. Most past and current project interven-
tions are largely based on raising local communities’ awareness of various health issues (HIV
and AIDS, reproductive health, etc.) to achieve sustainable behaviour change. However, as indi-
viduals move in and out of these communities it is hard to provide sufficient support and infor-
mation to achieve such change. Project associates, such as community health volunteers and
front-line social networkers, are similarly likely to move, which means that these resources
are not maintained within the community. Third, Burmese migrants comprise numerous
ethnic minorities. Thus, although the information, education, and communication materials
are prepared in Burmese, a proportion of the target group is unable to read them. It is also



































difficult to find suitable staff with the requisite language skills to undertake training and work
with these different language groups. Fourth, organisations working with Burmese migrants
need the co-operation of the local authorities. This tacit approval is necessary because
working with people who are outside the law by definition places the local NGO outside the
law as well. Without the support (or at least knowledge) of the Thai authorities, the NGO
would be unable to work effectively. This requires the NGO to establish strong relationships
and maintain them over time. While some Burmese target groups live on site at factories and
other places of employment, many live in nominally Thai communities. Support is required
not only from the Thai authorities but also from local community leaders, who are wary of
activities that might attract police raids. Finally, unlike development interventions aimed at
improving the circumstances of the Thai population, there are few (if any) institutional linkages
that can extend the benefits of these projects more widely. Because migrants cannot access
health and education services, projects must be self-sufficient, as they cannot claim additional
goods and services from various Thai ministries.
These difficulties are compounded by an underlying racism displayed by many Thais towards
Burmese people. Thailand and Burma have a long history of conflict and an equally long history
(perhaps dating back to the conquest of Ayuttha by the Burmese in 1767) of distrust and antip-
athy (Lang 2002). The Asian Migrant Centre reported in 2002 that Burmese suffer greater dis-
crimination than other migrants within Thailand, expressed in the inability of Burmese migrants
to register for anything other than ‘unskilled’ employment (Pearson 2005).
The economic implications must also be taken into account, as the relationship between Thais
and illegal Burmese migrants is not linear. Sections of the Thai economy depend upon migrant
Burmese labour. ‘The ILO observes that labour intensive industrialisation has been integral to
Thailand’s growth, and that the influx of migrant workers has enabled Thailand to maintain a
labour force to support its economic development. Conveniently, Burma is a plentiful source
of cheap, pliant labour for Thai industry’ (Urbano 2006: 22). Migrant labour, both registered
and unregistered, plays a role (more significant in Mae Sot than in Phuket) in ensuring economic
growth. Given that the main driving force for Burmese migration is the country’s poor econ-
omic performance, should a newly democratic state emerge in the near future, bringing with
Table 2. Types of abuse by Thai authorities encountered by migrants in Mae Sot
Type of abuse Percentage
Threatened 31.1
Yelled at 21.3
Cheated or had money stolen 9.8
Sworn at 7.3
Locked up or confined 2.8






(Number of respondents: 286)
Source: adapted from Panam et al. (2004)
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it new investment and rapid economic growth, it is possible that migration to Thailand will not
only cease but actually reverse, as migrants return home. Thus a strong case can be made for
improved migration procedures and conditions to ensure a reliable supply of labour to Thailand,
should the economic conditions in Burma improve.
While community participation may be necessary for sustained outcomes and impact,
similar participation can also result in harassment and deportation for illegal Burmese
migrants. A number of characteristics make community participation unlikely at best and
harmful at worst:
. Mobility. Burmese migrants are mobile. As noted above, staff of the local NGO estimate that
up to 50 per cent of migrants move each year to avoid debt and/harassment, or to seek
improved employment opportunities elsewhere.
. Lack of freedom of movement. Due to the threat of arrest, unregistered migrants seldom
venture beyond their workplace or community. But even registered migrants have restricted
freedoms and are not permitted to travel throughout Thailand, or even drive a motorcycle.
. Harassment. Migrants are subject to harassment by Thai authorities, both regularly and
occasionally. Crackdowns are unpredictable, and in some locations the authorities have
been accused of soliciting bribes and other payments from migrants under threat of deporta-
tion. (Migrants with permits also report such harassment.) Burmese migrants are wary of
working with those outside their immediate communities, because they are nervous of
provoking potential harassment. Likewise, host Thai communities and brothel or factory
owners are wary of working with NGOs, because they perceive that conflict and harassment
from Thai authorities might ensue.
. Difficulty in engaging with community members. Burmese community members often live at
their workplace and have limited free time. Fishermen, for example, work throughout the
night and have only a few hours on shore from mid-morning to mid-afternoon; factory
workers are permanently on call, except for one or two days a month, and must therefore
remain on the factory premises; commercial sex workers must be available to clients at all
times; and construction workers generally work 12 hours a day, with half a day off each
week. Those not working – perhaps mothers or the elderly – do not move outside their
community for fear of harassment.
. Migrants suffer exploitation. While nearly 90 per cent of Burmese migrants claim that they
were not exploited by traffickers in the course of their actual migration, they are exploited in
terms of their working conditions, including low pay, lack of holidays, and poor occupational
health and safety precautions within the workplace. Burmese migrants are routinely exploited
by their employers and by both the Thai and the Burmese authorities. They have little
recourse to the law, even if they are formally registered. Cases have been reported of the
Thai authorities deporting workers (registered and unregistered) who have taken industrial
action against their employers (Urbano 2006; ARCM 2004).
. Lack of government support. Illegal migrants are ineligible for any government services,
including health care and education. Thus, it is difficult for the local NGO to access any ser-
vices or goods (such as anti-retroviral medication) for those in need.
. Developing trust with migrant Burmese communities. Given their precarious status and the
inherent likelihood of arrest and deportation, migrants naturally suspect any individuals
and organisations seeking to assist them. Past experience of spies (representing both Thai
and Burmese authorities) and raids has made communities wary of trusting ‘outsiders’.
. Language difficulties. Working with Burmese communities requires the local NGO to work
not only in Burmese but also in a number of ethnic-minority languages. It is difficult to find
appropriate staff with these language skills.



































. Difficulty of attracting funding. The local NGO’s programmes have been implemented in an
ad hoc manner, in response to funding opportunities rather than guided by a comprehensive
multi-sectoral development plan. As a result, not all the development needs of migrant
Burmese communities are addressed.
. Staffing difficulty. The local NGO has found it difficult to recruit certain Burmese staff,
especially medical doctors.
As ‘outsiders’, illegal Burmese migrants are unable to participate in community-development
interventions in the same way as their Thai neighbours can. They cannot move freely within
their community or advocate on their own behalf to local authorities. They are suspicious of
the local NGO staff and have difficulty in communicating with them. Finally, they are wary
of any activities that may bring them to the attention of local Thai authorities, which may in
turn result in harassment or deportation. Their residence in Thailand is largely dependent
upon a high level of passivity and reliance on others – in effect, they must remain ‘invisible’.
Nevertheless, success can be achieved within these communities, in spite of the illegal
Burmese migrants’ limited opportunities to participate in community development. These com-
munities, despite their mobility, lack of personal freedom, and constraints on self-organisation,
do have some strengths that help local NGOs to achieve useful development outcomes.
. Behaviour change is possible. Despite the difficulties experienced by staff of the local NGO
over time, there has been reported success in sustained behaviour change within certain sec-
tions of migrant Burmese communities concerning some risk behaviours associated with the
transmission of HIV and AIDS, for example. Thus, in spite of the trying circumstances, it is
possible for projects to achieve their goals and outcomes.
. Great desire for improvement within migrant Burmese communities. The local NGO has been
able to develop trusting relationships with the more permanent sections of the illegal
Burmese migrant communities, and the communities have responded with a great desire to
improve their own situations. Rather than expressing hopelessness and helplessness, they
show genuine enthusiasm for change and development. Their inability to self-organise,
however, renders them largely dependent upon the local NGO for support and assistance.
. Commitment of local NGO staff to migrant Burmese communities. The Thai and Burmese
staff of the local NGO have demonstrated their personal commitment to working with
illegal Burmese migrant communities over a sustained period.
. Commitment of senior Thai public-sector officials to migrant Burmese communities. It would
be impossible for the local NGO to continue working with illegal Burmese migrant commu-
nities without the implicit support of senior Thai authorities. Over time, a number of officials
have expressed their appreciation of the work undertaken by the local NGO, and they have
acknowledged that without its assistance the migrant Burmese communities would be in
much more difficult circumstances.
It must also be understood that the success achieved by the local NGO in working with these
communities is rooted in a particular context. This includes a very high reliance on personal
relationships with key Thai public officials. While the Thai authorities cannot provide material
support to the local NGO’s work with illegal Burmese migrants, their implicit personal support
is necessary to ensure that the NGO is not frustrated in its efforts to work with these commu-
nities. Significant time is required to establish and nurture these relationships. Also, there is a
level of interdependence between Thai employers and Burmese workers. In certain areas, such
as Mae Sot, the local economy relies on Burmese labour. In this regard, the Thai employers and
the Burmese migrants are mutually dependent, although neither group fully recognises this fact.
Of course there are wider development needs, beyond health care, and although the local NGO’s
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projects have largely centred on health needs (and more precisely on responses to HIV and
AIDS), the development needs of illegal Burmese migrant communities include education,
water and sanitation, and income generation. Whether success in these areas can be achieved,
given the low level of participation that is possible, is yet to be tested. Finally, it is important to
note that the nature of illegal Burmese migrants is constantly changing. For example, in Phuket,
migrants were traditionally single men working in the fishing industry. Now there are many
migrants working in the construction industry, often men and women living as families. This
changes risk behaviour and development needs.
Illegal migrants as active citizens
These constraints are real and clearly work against the full participation of illegal Burmese
migrants in community-development interventions. Without this platform of participation
at the micro level, achieving any level of active citizenship at the meso or macro level by
this significant cohort of illegal migrants residing in Thailand is distinctly unlikely.
Encouraging participation, as discussed above, is problematic for a number of reasons, not
least the illegal status of the migrants and their high levels of mobility. Such constraints are mul-
tiplied when moving from local participation to active citizenship. While illegal Burmese
migrants who are registered to work have limited recourse to some legal protection (at least
in theory), in practice they are largely at the mercy of the local Thai authorities, including
the armed forces and immigration police. Burmese migrants are routinely arrested and deported
en masse.7 While their presence may be overlooked for economic reasons (indeed in Mae Sot,
illegal Burmese outnumber Thai citizens, and it is upon these migrants that the local economy
depends for its growth and strength), any semblance of civil disobedience or community organ-
isation results in arrest and harassment.
Illegal Burmese migrants therefore do not aspire to be active citizens, because they do not
have the supporting legal and political mechanisms required to assume such a role. For this
population, pressure to become active citizens would result in detrimental outcomes. Commu-
nity participation itself must also be managed differently from work with ‘legal’ populations.
This necessarily means that development interventions undertaken to improve the lives of
illegal migrants cannot fully hand over decision-making power to them, as this would attract
unwanted attention on the part of the local authorities and threaten the very safety of those
supposedly being assisted.
Local NGOs working with such communities must be prepared to fund and sustain welfare-
oriented interventions for the long term. While this may be seen as a step backwards, NGOs
must be willing to consider the circumstances and context of their beneficiaries and recognise
the genuine constraints that illegal migrants face in a host country. Such illegal migrants cannot
afford to be anything other than ‘invisible’ to local authorities, as otherwise they risk repatria-
tion and harassment. Although these illegal migrants are very mobile in a general sense, with a
large proportion of their settlements moving frequently and therefore making a sense of com-
munity difficult, in another sense they are also highly immobile, due to the travel restrictions
placed upon them. In order to maintain a level of ‘invisibility’, illegal migrants are limited to
those places where they can live and work without constant surveillance. Generally these
areas are the immediate workplace and the accommodation that is generally adjacent to (or
co-located within) these workplaces. For example, those working in the fishing industry
work and live on the boats or in the fishing canneries alongside the ports, while those in the
gem trade or other manufacturing industries live on the factory site, and those engaged in con-
struction also generally live on-site. These migrants cannot move freely around the wider town
or province, which makes it difficult for them to get access to health care, for instance. NGOs



































therefore have to provide mobile clinics to visit different locations on a regular basis. But the
idea that the local illegal Burmese migrant community themselves should organise and fund
such a mobile clinic is not viable, because of the spectre of ‘permanence’ that this would
generate.
The Thai authorities must maintain the fiction that illegal migrants do not exist, or that they
are in the country only for a short period. They cannot condone any activities that would expose
the reality behind this illusion. The illegal Burmese migrants are aware of this pantomime and
understand the role that they must play in order to maintain a ‘peaceful’ status quo. There is
therefore little demand from them for greater control of and participation in local development
initiatives, as this would endanger their current situation. At the meso or macro level there is
even less interest in becoming active citizens. NGOs must respect the positions of both the
Thai authorities and illegal Burmese migrants in this regard and facilitate on-going welfare-
oriented development interventions.
For the reasons given above, illegal Burmese migrants will not graduate into active citizen-
ship as we might expect other community participants to do. Nor, more importantly, should they
be forced to become active citizens by dint of the current ‘norms’ and conventions of commu-
nity-development practice. If participation is ‘best practice’ within community development, so
too is contextualisation in planning and design: thus in this instance the vulnerability of these
illegal Burmese migrants communities must take precedence, at the expense of expectations of
participation and active citizenship.
NGOs as advocate-guardians
Rather than considering such a conclusion as bleak, local NGOs working with such commu-
nities are presented with an opportunity to re-define who they are and how they can best
assist these communities to achieve improved development outcomes. Returning to Korten’s
(1990) four typologies, this inevitable welfare-based orientation does not necessarily reflect
directly the first generation of NGO activities that he described. It is inaccurate to characterise
these interventions simply as relief and welfare activities. More accurately, local NGOs oper-
ating within these particular constraints must themselves assume the role of proxy active citi-
zens on behalf of those who must remain invisible. In this particular instance, the local NGO
must assume the responsibilities of the local community in advocating on their behalf at the
local, regional, and national levels. As the illegal Burmese migrants are unable themselves to
give voice to their needs, the local NGO must be their voice. This role is also different from
de Senillosa’s (1998) typology of NGOs as ‘domestic change agents’. Local NGOs working
with illegal Burmese migrants must assume a dual role of delivery provider and community
representative. This dual role gives rise therefore to a new identity, that of advocate-guardian.
This role is quite different from what NGOs are used to. As advocates, they represent the com-
munity in different forums and provide a voice that would otherwise not be heard. As guardians,
they must also provide the basic goods and services that these communities are unable to access
independently, as they might do under other circumstances. While this role might appear to
resemble Korten’s (1990) initial relief and welfare typology, the likeness is superficial. In
addition to providing material services, including access to basic health care and education,
NGOs as advocate-guardians also advocate on behalf of the community and seek long-term sol-
utions to their difficulties. Neither this second role, nor any understanding of it, was included
within Korten’s original typology.
Such a dual role can cause tensions for local NGOs, because they must simultaneously
deliver interventions without arousing the ire of local authorities, and they must also directly
discuss the community’s situation with the Thai authorities. This position is complicated
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further by having to maintain the trust of cautious communities who fear harassment and depor-
tation. However, over time, it is expected that the advocate-guardian role will improve the
immediate circumstances of the migrant communities and also make their status more
secure. But, as the local NGO can attest, the role of advocate-guardian is a long-term undertak-
ing which entails self-imposed timeframes for shifts from this role to more traditional activities.
Conclusion
Community participation and active citizenship are valuable tools in driving sustainable
community-development outcomes. Experience indicates that development interventions that
are owned by beneficiaries and in which local beneficiaries and communities participate in
identifying, planning, implementing, and monitoring activities are likely to have greater and
more long-lasting impact than those interventions provided within a welfare model for
passive recipients. Seeking community participation in all its forms has become a development
fetish. Pursuing a fetish can, however, have negative consequences for third parties. Illegal
Burmese migrant communities in Thailand are such an example. These communities have a
very precarious existence within Thailand, and although they have been there for many
years, they are permeated by a lack of permanence and a sense of insecurity. There is a high
level of mobility, low level of trust, absence of protection from exploitation, lack of personal
freedom, and fear of harassment by the authorities. Past experience indicates that the Thai
authorities tend to respond to self-help and self-organisation initiatives with repatriation and
harassment. As illegal migrants, these communities cannot challenge anyone in authority.
They must, in short, remain invisible non-citizens. Instead, NGOs must assume the new role
of advocate-guardians for these communities.
Development interventions within these communities may require assistance that is reminis-
cent of NGOs’ past provision of relief and welfare services. However, NGOs must also reinter-
pret their role so that they not only intervene within a welfare paradigm but are also acting as the
communities’ representative at the micro, meso, and macro levels. The role of advocate-
guardian is a new one that has developed out of 15 years of working with illegal Burmese
migrants in Thailand. Participation and active citizenship is a powerful driver of change, but
those who are not citizens cannot be active in this sense, and nor should they be expected
to be. It is possible, however, that they can be aided by local NGOs committed to their
well-being and willing to become their voice. While this may not be sustainable or completely
adequate, the context and circumstances of these communities allow no alternatives that do not
endanger the safety of the community members.
Notes
1. The phrase ‘active participation’ is used to denote that participation must require greater incorporation
of the community than simply attending ‘consultative community meetings’ at which they are spoken to
rather than being part of a dialogue; cf. Chambers’ (1983) notion of an unconstrained dialogue with the
poor.
2. This excludes the political refugees currently located in the refugee camps located along the border
within Mae Sot province. Indeed, the ensuing discussion focuses on those illegal migrants who
could be more accurately described as economic rather than political refugees – acknowledging of
course that the parlous economic state of Burma is directly linked to the long military rule and the
economic and political policies pursued by the State.
3. Fifty years ago, Thailand and Burma had similar per capita GDPs.



































4. It was reported to the author that some illegal Burmese migrants who are HIV-positive return on a
regular basis to receive anti-retroviral treatment that is provided by an international NGO in their
home village and not available to them in Thailand.
5. Given the political nature of work with illegal populations, and the potential consequences for its work
with other communities within Thailand, the NGO’s identity is not disclosed.
6. Personal communication with local Thai-based NGO staff in Mae Sot.
7. Just as frequently they cross the border back to Thailand – often on the same day – and resume their
illegal existence, as if arrest and deportation were a simple distraction in their day-to-day lives.
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